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Abstract
In this paper, we address the role of countries’ goods trade networks for their
services trade volume. The paper employs a large cross-section of bilateral
trade data on aggregate cross-border goods and services sales and illustrates
that the depth and overlap of two countries’ services networks induce a pos-
itive direct impact on their services trade volume. The evidence takes into
account that goods trade flows and networks are potentially endogenous so
that the estimated direct effects support a causal interpretation. We find
that the magnitude of the multilateral goods-trade network effect on the bi-
lateral services-trade volume is much larger than that of bilateral goods-trade
volume.
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1 Introduction
It is now widely agreed that a substantial part of the explanation for the extraordi-
nary growth in trade from the 1980s forward is the application of increasingly refined
strategies of global organization of production involving trade in intermediates, out-
sourcing, foreign direct investment, et cetera in virtually endless combinations (e.g.,
Baldwin, 2006, 2014; Yi, 2003).1 It has been widely noted that such global sourc-
ing strategies involve complex patterns of flows of (primarily intermediate) goods
passing into international trade many times, in many combinations, before reaching
final consumers (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2014; Johnson and Noguera, 2012a,
b; Francois, Manchin, and Tomberger 2013). While the role of intermediate goods
has been studied in this context, less commonly commented on, and even less sys-
tematically studied, is the role of services in supporting this trade (though see Low,
2013, for an exception). In this paper, we focus directly on trade in services and its
relationship to trade in goods, emphasizing the role of services trade in supporting
complexity in goods trade.
In fact, there is a literature on the economics of trade services in the context of
standard trade models (Deardorff, 1985, 2001; Markusen, 1989; Melvin, 1989; Fran-
cois, 1990b; ; van Marrewijk, Stibora, de Vaal, and Viaene, 1997; Lennon, Mirza,
and Nicoletti, 2009). That is, these are services supporting trade (i.e., transporta-
tion, insurance, etc.), not services supporting a broader division of labor of the sort
considered in the unbundling of production.2 The latter is our particular focus. It is
1The same fact was, not surprisingly, a major part of the dramatic collapse of trade during the
recent financial crisis (Bems, Johnson, and Yi, 2009, 2011; Ferrantino and Taglioni, 2014; Milberg
and Winkler, 2010).
2An exception in this regard is the work of Francois (1990a, c) who is specifically interested in
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interesting to note, in this context, that the rapid increase in trade associated with
global sourcing does not seem to correlate with either a corresponding fall in formal
protection (Yi, 2003) or transportation cost (Hummels, 2007). Instead, what Bald-
win (2006, 2014) calls the second unbundling is more associated with widespread
adoption of infomatic technology. By permitting the adoption of global sourcing,
the associated fall in the overall coordination costs of managing a global production
structure will increase demand not only for infomatic services, but for trade services
supporting physical flows of intermediates, like transportation, insurance, finance,
et cetera over the geographic domain of that global sourcing.
As Baldwin (2011) notes, the firm-level properties of the second unbundling have
implications for the geographic distribution of economic activity. Specifically, while
the information costs of managing a global production structure may not rise with
distance (at least at the rate that the other trade costs do), distance might well proxy
for generalized uncertainty and, perhaps more to the point, the costs of managerial
attention (e.g., the costs to managers of traveling to facilities abroad) may rise quite
dramatically with distance. All of this suggests that, ceteris paribus, there may
be a strongly regional cast to this sort of specialization. Of course, cetera are not
generally paribus. There may well be labor markets with wages (conditional on
productivity) sufficiently low to make contracting for part of the production process
worth the coordination cost. For our purposes, the essential thing is that similar
firms will want to engage in similar global sourcing strategies.3 To the extent that,
services permitting a broader and more complex production structure. For a broad overview of
the literature on trade in services, see Francois and Hoekman (2010).
3For example, an American firm and a European firm, with similar production structures, might
source medium skill components from Latin America and Eastern Europe respectively, but both
might find Asia attractive for low skill assembly.
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as argued above, a sizable share of trade growth was growth in global sourcing,
post second unbundling, we would expect to see the emergence of patterns of trade
reflecting common global sourcing strategies. In network terms, that means that we
should see countries with firms pursuing common global sourcing strategies revealing
substantial trade overlap – that is, they would have overlapping trade networks.
This has interesting implications for service trade. Much of the earlier literature
on service trade suggests that trade services have a substantial degree of specificity.
In the simple case, they are specific to a transaction (e.g., a haircut requires proxim-
ity to a head), but more generally they are often specific to a given market (e.g., local
legal services, local knowledge, etc.). Furthermore, especially if there are economies
of scale in the organization of such services, we might find firms specializing is pro-
vision of market-specific services located in a given exporter’s market. If this is the
case, a pair of countries with similar global sourcing strategies (i.e., countries with
firms that operate in overlapping markets) would be expected to trade services more
intensively between themselves than would two otherwise similar countries without
the trade overlap. Thus, the empirical work reported in this paper seeks to explain
service trade with, as well as standard trade cost and other variable in a gravity
model, a measure of trade overlap grounded in network theory.
Ours is far from the first paper to study service trade in the context of an econo-
metric gravity model. Much of this work is primarily interested in the question of
whether the same variables explain trade in services that explain trade in goods.
Applied to trade in goods, the gravity model is so successful that it is reasonable
to characterize it as the industry standard empirical framework for the analysis
of international trade. With the development of coherent micro foundations in
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general equilibrium theory, considerable clarity has been gained in terms of appro-
priate specification and interpretation of the results of gravity models (Eaton and
Kortum, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch,
2013).4 Among standard findings from this research are that trade robustly de-
clines with distance (Disdier and Head, 2008), borders reduce trade (Anderson and
van Wincoop, 2001; Anderson and Yotov, 2010), and preferential trade agreements
increase trade (Cipollina and Salvatici, 2010). While the empirical literature on
trade in services has developed more recently, improved data on that trade has led
to quite rapid growth in such research. Proceeding from research which presumes
that economic delivery of services is fundamentally different from that for goods,
most of this research has simply asked whether the same factors explain trade in
services as trade in goods (e.g., Ceglowski, 2006; Kimura and Lee, 2006; Walsh,
2008; Head, Mayer, and Rieds, 2009; Christen and Francois 2010; Egger, Larch,
and Staub, 2012; Kandilov and Grennes, 2012; Guillin, 2013; van der Marel and
Shepherd, 2013; Anderson, Milot, and Yotov, 2014). Most of these find that stan-
dard gravity variables that the same effects as to sign (i.e., distance and borders
reduce trade, PTAs increase it).5 Of particular relevance for our work, a number
of papers have found complementarity between trade in goods and trade in services
(Ceglowski, 2006; Kimura and Lee, 2006) and between foreign direct investment and
trade in services (Gru¨nfeld and Moxnes, 2003; Fillat Castejon, Francois, and Woerz,
2008). The specifications in these papers are based on the trade services notion that
4For up to date surveys of theoretical and empirical issues, see: Anderson (2011); Bergstrand
and Egger (2011); Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2014); and Head and Mayer (2014).
5As with many bodies of research, there is not unanimity on any of these results. Thus, for
example, Kandilov and Grennes (2012) do not find a significant effect of distance; Gru¨nfeld and
Moxnes (2003) do not find an effect of PTAs.
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services (like transportation and insurance) are tied to trade (or FDI) in a direct
way. Thus, trade is directly included as a variable in the service trade gravity model.
As explained above, we are interested in the idea that, in addition to trade services,
business services supported by infomatics support the second unbundling. Thus,
based on the above discussion, we use a measure of good trade network overlap as a
proxy for common networks that would demand common services broadly construed.
Our research question is motivated, in part, by recent research on social net-
works (Kolaczyk, 2009; Newman, 2010; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The tools,
and conceptual structures, developed by network researchers provide a very useful
approach to understanding and characterizing structures of social interaction. These
have already proved useful in research on international trade (See Rauch 2001 for a
convenient survey). While much research by economists focuses on networks as an
emergent property created by agent behavior or as a constraint on individual behav-
ior (e.g. Jackson, 2008; Goyal, 2009; Easley and Kleinberg, 2010), in this paper, we
are more interested in trade network structures (strictly network homophily) as an
indicator of a need for common network coordination issues that require common
service inputs.
In what follows, we outline an empirical gravity model of services trade which is
fit to being used for estimating the role of goods trade networks for services trade
volume in the subsequent section. Section 3 describes the sources and characteristics
of data this model is informed with. Section 4 summarizes the key findings from the
empirical analysis, and the last section concludes with a brief summary and outline
for future research.
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2 A gravity model of services trade
A generic model of bilateral trade for any sector and year (suppressing the sector
and year indices) may be written as
Xij = exp(τij + µi +mj + uij), (1)
where Xij measures the volume of exports of country i to country j (or imports
of j from i), τij is a trade-cost function that we will specify below, µi and mj are
exporter- and importer-specific effects related to supply and demand potential, and
uij) is a disturbance (or stochastic) term. Since everything in the parentheses on
the right-hand side of (3) comes under the exponential expression, the respective
elements {τij, µi,mj, uij} are measured in logs. Leading examples in the literature
(see Bergstrand, 1985, 1989; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop,
2003) specify the trade-cost function in a log-additive way, we may write
τij =
K∑
k=1
αktk,ij, (2)
where tk,ij is the kth trade-cost factor (e.g., log bilateral distance but also binary
indicator variables measuring land adjacency, common language, common history,
etc.) and αk is the parameter on it (a partial elasticity for variables in logs and
a partial semi-elasticity for binary variables). We admit that µi and mj have a
structural interpretation and are nonlinear functions of τij (see Eaton and Kortum,
2002; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Fally, 2015). However, the latter is of minor
importance here, since we condition on them through fixed effects (as, e.g., in Eaton
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and Kortum, 2002; Egger, Larch, Staub, and Winkelmann, 2011; or Fally, 2015).
What is of primary interest here are estimates of τij and, hence, αk, in particular,
to the extent that they relate to bilateral goods trade volume and bilateral goods
trade network overlap with Xij measuring the bilateral volume of services trade.
3 Specification of the trade-cost function and data
3.1 Dependent variable
As the dependent variable to the present analysis, we employ the aggregate volume
of services trade. We present regressions, where this variable corresponds to all
services trade volume consistent with balance-of-payments statistics (corresponding
to EBOPS code 200 in the respective classification) and ones, where we exclude
merchanting (so that the the left-hand side variable corresponds to EBOPS code
200 minus code 270).6 The respective data refer to the year 2011 and are available
from Francois and Pindyuk (2014).
3.2 Specification of the trade-cost function and data sources
We propose a trade-cost function which includes four classes of components: ones
relating to goods trade volume and networks; ones relating to geography; ones re-
lating to common culture and history; and ones relating to politics. Moreover, since
we consider goods trade volume and network factors as endogenous determinants of
6Merchanting is a net rather than gross flow concept, and it does not correspond to trade in
services as discussed here. Indeed the most recent set of balance of payments guidelines calls for
this exact same adjustment; see Takeda (2006) and International Monetary Fund (2009).
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services trade, we consider goods-tariff measures as instruments in a just-identified
approach (where the number of identifying instruments corresponds to the number
of endogenous right-hand-side variables).
Goods trade volume and network factors: We utilize two types of variables
which relate to goods trade which we measure in 2011 based on information from
the United Nations’ Comtrade database. One is the volume of goods trade between
countries i and j. This we measure as the log of the total bilateral goods trade
volume, xGij = ln(X
G
ij + X
G
ji), where X
G
ij and X
G
ji are the exports of and imports by
country i to/from country j. The second variable measures the goods-trade network
overlap of two countries i and j. The latter is defined as follows. Use Gi,−j and
Gj,−1 to denote the set of all export partners of countries i and j expect for partners
j and i, respectively. Then, we may specify network-overlap index as netGij as the
log number of elements of the overlapping set of countries, Gi,−j ∩ Gj,−i. In the
empirical analysis, we employ xGij as one variable and net
G
ij as another one.
Geographical factors: Key geographical factors used in the literature on the de-
terminants of goods and services trade are log geographical distance, distij, and a
binary variable capturing common land borders, bordij. The data on these vari-
ables come from the Centre dE´tudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales’
(CEPII’s) gravity variable database.
Common cultural and historical factors: We employ measures on ethnolog-
ical language communality, langij, as well as on prior colonial relationships – one
measuring whether i was a colony of j or vice versa, colonyij, and one measuring
whether i and j have had a common colonizer in the past, colonizerij.
Political factors: We include one measure which captures the difference in polit-
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ical freedom and the functioning of the political systems of two countries i and j.
Specifically, we use the absolute difference in the Polity IV index scaled by the sum
of two countries’ individual index values as published by Marshall (2014), dpolityij.
Instruments: We use log applied (one-plus) simply-averaged goods-tariff rates
between pairs of countries (on imports of i from j and vice versa) as a variable that
exclusively affects bilateral goods-trade volume. The corresponding data come from
the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
In order to describe the variation in the data, we report the coefficient of variation
(standard deviation divided by the mean) and the normalized maximum spread
(maximum minus minimum over the mean). We do so in Table 1, which mentions
the acronyms and definitions of variables in a first column, the coefficient of variation
(Std.dev./Mean) in a second column, and the normalized maximum spread ((Max.-
Min./Mean)) in the last column. In some of the empirical analysis we will report
instrumental-variable (through control-function) regression results, where we treat
xGij and net
G
ij as endogenous, and in some of those regressions we treat ptaij as an
identifying instrument (affecting xGij and net
G
ij but not services trade volume, Xij,
while in others we let ptaij affect Xij directly (notice that a few preferential trade
agreements also are services-trade agreements). Therefore, we report statistics on
ptaij twice – once under the exogenous determinants of goods and services trade
and once under the identifying instruments at the bottom of Table 1. Notice that
the descriptive statistics are not the same for ptaij in the two respective rows. The
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reason is that goods-trade exports, XGij , contain much fewer missing values than
services-trade exports, Xij so that the number of observations on ptaij is much
bigger when it is used as an identifying instrument.7
– Table 1 here –
Overall, the descriptive statistics indicate that the two identifying instruments
display a good degree of variation relative to the endogenous right-hand-side vari-
ables, netGij and x
G
ij.
3.4 Implementation of the stochastic model
The implementation works in two steps. In the first step, we run a model for goods
trade akin to the one in equation (3) by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (see
Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) with exporter and importer fixed effects. This
model contains the geographical factors, the common cultural and historical factors,
the political factos and the instruments listed in Section 3.2 in but it naturally lacks
the goods trade volume and network factors from the trade cost function. This
model obtains residuals as specified in equation (3) which we denote for convenience
by uˆGij. Based on the latter, we specify a control function
cij = β1uˆ
G
ij + β2(uˆ
G
ij)
2. (3)
7Obviously, also the number of the other exogenous determinants of trade would be larger in that
case, but it turns out that the variability of those regressors is more similar between the services-
trade and the goods-trade regressions, so that we decided to not report descriptive statistics for
these variables twice for the sake of brevity.
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In the second step, we estimate
Xij = exp(τij + µi +mj + cij + uij) (4)
for services trade volume by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood, which corresponds
to (3) except for the inclusion of cij which guards against the endogeneity bias of
the parameters on the goods-trade-volume and goods-network-overlap variables in
the services-trade-volume regression (see Wooldridge, 2010).8
4 Empirical results
The empirical results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. While we assume that netGij
and xGij are exogenous in Table 2, we treat them as endogenous right-hand-side vari-
ables as outlined in Section 3.4 in Table 3. Each of the two tables reports parameter
estimates and – underneath them – heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors at the
top and some information about the sample size and the explanatory power of the
models at the bottom. Moreover, each table is organized in two horizontal blocks:
two columns on the left-hand side contain results for data on all services exports
(corresponding to ebops category 200), and the ones on the right-hand side contain
results for data on all services exports except for merchanting (corresponding to
ebops category 268). All of the regression results pertain to two-way fixed effects
models with fixed exporter and importer effects.
– Tables 2 and 3 here –
8In order to guard against biased inference, we bootstrap jointly over the two steps.
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The reported values for the pseudo-R2 suggest that the explanatory power of all
models (including the first-stage regression in Table 3) is quite high. Moreover, the
results suggest that – unless we treat netGij and x
G
ij as endogenous – the cultural,
geographical, historical, and political pair-specific variables have little explanatory
power for bilateral services trade. However, once treating netGij and x
G
ij as endoge-
nous, which seems plausible, this pattern changes to some extent. Let us therefore
concentrate on the relevant results in Table 3.
That table suggests that both ptaij and tariffmargij are relevant regressors in
the goods-trade model and have a high individual and joint relevance. Hence, they
should work well as identifying instruments for both netGij and x
G
ij. Moreover, the
the cultural, economic, geographical, historical, and political pair-specific variables
affect bilateral goods trade in the expected way. Notice that the tariff margin is the
extent of tariff-reductions granted relative to the most-favored-nation rate so that
we expect a positive sign for this variable which it indeed carries (notice that the
importer fixed effects in the goods-trade model captures the most-favored nation
tariff rate).
The coefficient on netGij is 8.267 and 10.138 in the two models for all services
trade and it is 28.815 and 29.615 without merchanting, depending on whether we
include ptaij in the second-stage regression or not. How large is the impact of mul-
tilateral goods-trade networks? For this, notice that the standard deviation of this
variable (not reported in Table 1) amounts to 0.105. Hence, in Specification 1, an
increase of netGij by one standard deviation raises bilateral services trade volume by
100(exp(8.267 · 0.105) − 1) ≈ 138%. In comparison, the impact of bilateral goods-
trade volume on services-trade volume is small (for all services trade) or negligible
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(for services trade without merchanting). The latter points to a strong complemen-
tarity between multilateral goods-trade liberalization and the proliferation not only
of goods-trade but also of services-trade volume. Up until now, the latter tends to be
ignored in reduced-form as well as structural-form work on the effects of goods-trade
liberalization.
5 Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to shed light on the role of goods trade – multilateral
networks as well as bilateral volume – for services-trade activity at the country-pair
level. The approach taken was one of the estimation of multiplicative (exponential-
family) models of bilateral services-trade volume where – apart from traditional
trade costs and supply potential as well as demand potential – a country-pairs’
goods-trade network overlap as well as its bilateral goods-trade volume were con-
sidered as factors that could potentially stimulate bilateral services trade.
Using data on the largest-possible cross section of country pairs with recorded
services-trade data for 2011, the evidence in this paper suggests that, conditional on
other factors and when considering goods-trade networks and volume as endogenous,
it is the overlap in goods-trade networks but not bilateral goods-trade volume which
stimulates services trade. The associated effect on services-trade volume is large,
dominating, e.g., effects of trade agreements on goods-trade volume in magnitude
by a large margin.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Std.dev./Mean (Max.-Min./Mean)
Endogenous variables
Xij (all services trade; ebops=200) 3.773 17.680
Xij (services trade w/o merchanting; ebops=268) 3.695 17.259
netGij (goods trade network overlap) 0.022 6.163
XGij (goods exports) 4.465 33.822
xGij (log goods exports plus imports) 0.248 7.449
Exogenous variables in trade regressions
distij (log distance) 0.137 5.114
bordij (land adjacency) 4.607 4.822
langij (common language) 3.354 3.651
colonyij (colonial relationship) 5.344 5.530
colonizerij (common colonizer) 5.475 5.656
dpolityij (norm. abs. diff. In Polity IV scores) 1.182 4.270
ptaij (members of same PTA) 1.907 2.431
Identifying instruments in goods-trade regression
tariffmargij (tariff margin extended) -3.647 23.675
ptaij (members of same PTA) 2.175 2.634
Notes: ptaij is listed twice, since the number of observations in the goods-trade regression differs largely from
those in the services-trade regressions. The mean-normalized statistics given indicate the degree of variation of the
respective variables.
Table 2: Regression Results Assuming
Exogenous Goods-Trade Variables
Variable Spec 1. Spec. 2. Spec. 1 Spec. 2
netGij 8.035 * 9.495 ** 27.316 *** 27.823 ***
4.160 4.240 4.966 4.988
xGij 0.563 *** 0.550 *** 0.591 *** 0.593 ***
0.038 0.038 0.064 0.063
distij -0.036 -0.017 0.002 -0.001
0.041 0.043 0.080 0.080
bordij -0.017 0.003 0.062 0.064
0.088 0.088 0.126 0.125
langij 0.108 0.052 -0.027 -0.035
0.108 0.116 0.151 0.151
colonyij 0.283 *** 0.329 *** -0.188 -0.193
0.108 0.113 0.125 0.126
colonizerij -0.105 -0.110 0.645 0.633
0.223 0.227 0.535 0.535
dpolityij -0.262 -0.225 9.456 *** 9.599 ***
0.357 0.383 3.073 3.255
ptaij - 0.328 *** - 1.187 **
- 0.121 - 0.465
R2 0.857 0.856 0.889 0.890
Obs. 3221 3221 2015 2015
Dependent variable:
All services yes yes no no
Services w/o merchanting no no yes yes
Notes: Robust standard erors are reported below coefficients. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively, using two-tailed test statistics.
Table 3: Regression Results Assuming
Endogenous Goods-Trade Variables
Variable Spec 3. Spec. 1. Spec. 2 Spec. 1 Spec. 2
netGij - 8.267 * 10.138 ** 28.815 *** 29.615 ***
- 4.568 4.524 4.844 4.868
xGij - 0.358 *** 0.213 *** -0.010 -0.019
- 0.085 0.082 0.086 0.086
distij -0.534 *** -0.157 *** -0.197 *** -0.355 *** -0.366 ***
0.021 0.054 0.054 0.080 0.081
bordij 0.568 *** 0.089 0.188 ** 0.395 *** 0.403 ***
0.064 0.083 0.078 0.125 0.124
langij 0.158 * 0.176 0.118 0.014 0.003
0.083 0.113 0.115 0.137 0.137
colonyij 0.067 0.294 *** 0.375 *** -0.257 ** -0.264 **
0.064 0.098 0.098 0.112 0.112
colonizerij 0.332 ** 0.034 0.059 1.259 ** 1.266 **
0.156 0.254 0.252 0.547 0.546
dpolityij 0.872 *** -0.180 -0.038 12.866 *** 13.306 ***
0.210 0.367 0.398 3.320 3.519
ptaij 0.669 *** - 0.557 *** - 1.395 ***
0.094 - 0.127 - 0.417
tariffmargij 6.698 ** - - - -
3.057 - - - -
η0.5ij - 0.675 * 1.019 *** 2.812 *** 2.888 ***
- 0.363 0.355 0.579 0.582
ηij - -0.083 -0.118 -0.578 *** -0.596 ***
- 0.089 0.088 0.170 0.171
η2ij - 0.000 0.000 0.006 *** 0.006 ***
- 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
R2 0.867 0.865 0.869 0.907 0.907
Observations 7212 3059 3059 1936 1936
All goods yes no no no no
All services no yes yes no no
Services w/o merchanting no no no yes yes
Notes: Robust standard erors are reported below coefficients. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively, using two-tailed test statistics.
Appendix: Sample composition
Countries which are only available as goods exporters and importers:
Benin, Botswana, Guinea, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Philippines,
Venezuela, United Arab Emirates.
Countries which are only available as services importers as well as as
goods exporters and importers: Comoros, Morocco, Mozambique, Pakistan,
Qatar.
Countries which are available as services as well as goods exporters
and importers: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala,
Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kaza-
khstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland,
Portugal, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United States,
Uruguay, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
